COMMANDERS DIGEST

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE • WASHINGTON, D.C.

Vol. 7, No. 9 November 29, 1969

Assistant Secretary of Defense Daniel Henkin

Fewer Pentagon Backgrounders; On-The-Record News Encouraged

The Defense Department's top information man says the Pentagon is relying less on "backgrounders" as a means of getting information to newsmen.

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Daniel Henkin said Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird believes that "to the maximum extent possible, we should put our news on the record, attributable to a particular Defense official."

Mr. Henkin described a "backgrounder" as a time-honored Washington institution in which high government officials give information to the press but cannot be quoted. "We believe that on-the-record, attributable news discussions encourage the flow of authoritative information to the public," he said.

He emphasized, though, that diminishing use of "backgrounders" at the Defense level was not necessarily a rule that had to be followed by commanders in the field.

"There are particular circumstances that govern a particular method in which information is released, so I would not want to make any caveat on any particular activity of a commander in the field who must make the judgment," he said.

Mr. Henkin said he believes DoD is "expediting and expanding" the flow of information to the public.

He also noted that DoD has increased the number of news conferences and has improved the coordination and cooperation among his office and the Service information chiefs.

DoD Equal Opportunity Policies Reviewed in Vietnam, Thailand

A team of Presidential and Department of Defense representatives is touring military installations in the Republic of Vietnam and Thailand to assess and promote equal opportunity policies.

The visits are a followup to similar world-wide trips made by White House and DoD officials in 1967 and 1968.

The group includes L. Howard Bennett, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Civil Rights); Bruce Rabb, Staff Assistant to the President; David I. Cooper, Jr., Staff Assistant to Mr. Bennett; and Arthur M. Sussman, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs).

Mr. Bennett said the group will "assess the extent to which policies of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Military Departments in the areas of equality of opportunity and treatment are being carried out and implemented in the field."

Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird expressed his interest in equal opportunity in a speech in Philadelphia last August. At

(Continued on Page 2)

More Accurate Cost Estimates Envisioned by Air Force Vice CofS

More accurate cost estimates may result from the Milestone Procurement Concept that will be used in the F-15 contract, said General John C. Meyer, Air Force vice chief of staff.

He told members of the National Security Industrial Association the concept provides that a program will not go beyond a specified point until all accomplishments required for that contract milestone have been achieved.

"It ties continued development and release of production funds to a contractor's successful achievement of these well-defined milestones," the general said.

Gen. Meyer explained the three major parts of the F-15 contract:

"Part I covers design, redesign, and the operating cost of testing and will be negotiated on a cost-plus-incentive fee basis. Part II is the test aircraft and hardware to support a

(Continued on Page 2)

General Meyer

More Accurate Cost Estimates Envisioned by Air Force Vice CofS

(Continued from Page 1)

flight test program. Part III covers production of the first wing of aircraft, and training equipment. These last two parts will be written on a fixed price—incentive—successive target basis.

"The possibility of upward revision of contract costs, based on accumulated experience, will be taken into consideration. A ceiling will be established beyond which costs will not be reimbursed. There is a need for flexibility in both estimating and implementation, but there also is a need for greater realism than has sometimes existed in the past."

The early identification of technical risks, the general said, by both the Air Force and contractors, is important to both estimating and accomplishment.

"Technical risks have not always been assessed with a cold eye, and the results can be severe in cost increases," he said.

Another goal will be to hold down the number of program changes. "Sometimes the change is worth the cost," Gen. Meyer said. "Often it is not, and occasionally we have paid a lot to gain a little."

The Air Force also would like to reduce the number of specialized management reports required from contractors. Gen. Meyer explained:

"Very often the data we need is available in a different format from the contractor's internal management data system. Some contractors have not been aware that their data may be adapted to our requirements. In other cases, our informational needs have been tied to incompatible intervals, and separate—apparently redundant—reports have been necessary. This appears to be an area where reduction of paper work is practical."

The general hopes the management procedures set up for the F-15 will be a breakthrough in improving weapons system acquisition.

Supervision of the program has been decentralized to Air Force Systems Command. The Program Element Monitor is located in that command, rather than in the Air Staff. The Systems Program Office at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, has immediate responsibility for managing the program. Progressive review has been streamlined to eliminate marginally productive layers between the Systems Program Office and the Air Force Secretary and Chief of Staff.

Said the general:

"There are some bugs that will have to be worked out of this new decentralized and streamlined procedure. We expect that it will fix authority and accountability clearly and visibly, improve coordination, hold the number of developmental changes to a minimum and speed up the periodic review process and the flow of key information to decision makers. It should also improve supervision of industry performance in the developmental and production stages."

DoD Equal Opportunity Policies Reviewed in Vietnam, Thailand

(Continued from Page 1)

that time he disclosed a set of "human goals" to increase the attractiveness of a career in the Department of Defense.

Among the requirements he listed in order to attain these goals were :

—To make military and civilian service in the Department of Defense a model of equal opportunity for all, regardless of race or creed or national origin.

—And to hold those who do business with the Department to full compliance with the policy of equal employment opportunities.

The group visited bases in the continental United States and installations in Europe in May 1968, and Vietnam and Thailand in October 1968.

Visits to Japan, Korea, Okinawa, the Republic of the Philippines and Hawaii will be made in January 1970, with installations in Europe to be toured in April 1970.

Other members of the Department of Defense Directorate who will participate in future visits are: Charles F. Kane, director of Equal Opportunity in Off-Base Housing; Colonel James R. Hillard, director for Civil Rights; C. Stuart Board, director, Equal Employment Opportunity, and Commander L. L. Miller, staff assistant to the director, Equal Employment Opportunity.

General Westmoreland: 'Soldier Of The Future Will Fight On A More Automated Battlefield'

The soldier of the future will fight on a more automated battlefield, Army Chief of Staff General William Westmoreland has predicted.

He told members of the Association of the United States Army that on the battlefield of the future, enemy forces will be located, tracked and targeted almost instantaneously through the use of data links, computer assisted intelligence evaluation, and automated fire control.

He said, "With first round kill probabilities approaching certainty, and with surveillance devices that can continually track the enemy, the need for large forces to fix the opposition physically will be less important."

Gen. Westmoreland explained that based on our total battlefield experience and our proven technological capability, he foresees a new battlefield array . . .



General Westmoreland

—Battlefields or combat areas that are under 24 hour real or near real time surveillance of all types.

—Battlefields on which we can destroy anything we locate through instant communications and the almost instantaneous application of highly lethal firepower.

—A continuing need for highly mobile combat forces to asist in fixing and destroying the enemy.

He said, "The changed battlefield will dictate that the supporting logistics system also undergo change."

Gen. Westmoreland continued:

—I see the forward end of the logistics system with mobility equal to the supporting force.

—I see the elimination of many intermediate support echelons and the use of inventory-in-motion techniques.

—I see some Army forces supported by air—in some instances directly from bases here in the continental United States.

In both the combat and support forces of the future, I see a continuing need for our traditionally highly skilled, well-motivated individual soldier . . . the soldier who has always responded in time of crisis . . . and the soldier who will accept and meet the challenge of the future.

To achieve this concept of our future Army, we have established at the Department of Army Staff level, a Systems Manager, Brigadier General Bill Fulton, to coordinate all Army activities in this field. We have done this because of problem complexity. We are dealing with systems that are fundamental to the Army—its doctrine, its organizations, and its equipment. We are on the threshold for the first time in achieving maximum utilization of both our firepower and our mobility. In order to succeed in this effort, we need the scientific and engineering support of both the military and the industrial communities.

To complement the systems management, we are establishing at Fort Hood, Tex., a test facility through which new equipment, new organizations and new techniques can be subjected to experimentation, adaption, evaluation and integration. This facility will be headed by Major General Jack Norton who will report to the Project Director Lieutenant General Bev Powell, III Corps Commander and Commanding General, Fort Hood.

VISITS SIXTH FLEET—Captain Warren H. O'Neil, commanding officer of the USS Saratoga (CVA-60) (left), the Honorable John H. Chafee, secretary of the Navy, and Vice Admiral David C. Richardson, commander of the U.S. Sixth Fleet, stand together on Saratoga's flight deck during the secretary's recent European tour to view Naval facilities, meet field commanders and visit deployed units.

BACKGROUND ON THE PARIS PEACE TALKS

"We should be confident that an honorable peace is possible if we here at home remain steady."

—President Nixon

The search for peace in Viet-Nam and Southeast Asia is a matter of the highest priority to the United States. No other question so engages the time and attention of the President and his principal advisors.

The U.S. delegation to the Paris Peace talks on Viet-Nam has used the weekly meetings since January 1969 to lay out an extensive program for peace. This program provides for a mutual withdrawal of all non-South Vietnamese forces, supervised cease-fires, free elections under international supervision, and the early release of prisoners of war on both sides. The United States endorses the proposals of President Nguyen Van Thieu of the Republic of Viet-Nam for the conduct of free elections in which all political parties and groups can participate. Both we and the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam have stated we will abide by the results of those elections.

Ambassador Lodge

Our objective at Paris is meaningful negotiation and compromise, leading to a resolution of the crucial issues which divide us, and not rigid insistence upon one's own individual position. While the other side's 10-point proposal contains certain unacceptable provisions, some points appear negotiable, and our delegation has tried to examine these at the Paris sessions to find common ground between our respective positions. Neither the U.S. Government nor the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam poses any precondition for such discussions. But the other side has never tried to find in our proposals common elements on which we might agree or which we might even further examin. On the contrary, the other side always flatly rejects them.

The United States has taken a number of important steps to reduce the level of violence, beginning with the partial cessation of bombing in North Viet-Nam in March 1968 and the total cessation of all acts of force against North Viet-Nam in November 1968. Our air operations in South Viet-Nam have been reduced by over 20 percent. The emphasis has been shifted from maximum military pressure on the enemy to holding U.S. combat losses to a minimum while undertaking operations consistent with our mission to protect allied forces and the civilian population. We have begun to reduce our presence in South Viet-Nam by setting in motion the replacement of over 60,000 U.S. troops. On September 16, 1969, President Nixon ordered a reduction of the troop ceiling in Viet-Nam to 484,000 by December 15, 1969.

To date, all U.S. efforts to get serious negotiations underway at Paris have failed for two reasons:

(1) the other side's insistence that its proposals can be the only basis for discussion; and

(2) its adamant refusal to negotiate with the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam on any basis whatsoever.

In spite of this, the United States and its allies continue to press for meaningful discussions at Paris. We have made it very plain that we consider all the points at issue negotiable except the basic right of the South Vietnamese to determine their own future.

The Paris talks represent the culmination of a long process of diplomatic negotiation and maneuver. Since 1965 the United States has sought peace in conferences with hundreds of world figures, undertaken many public initiatives for peace, and participated in hundreds of high-level private talks with friends and adversaries throughout the world. North Viet-Nam rejected all these proposals until President Johnson announced on March 31, 1968, a unilateral reduction of the level of hostilities—an end to the bombing of 78 percent of the territory of Viet-Nam, restricting it to the area north of the demilitarized zone (DMZ) where the enemy buildup threatened allied forward positions. At the same time, the President proposed bilateral talks with the North Vietnamese to bring the war to an end.

On April 3, 1968, North Viet-Nam indicated its readiness to establish preliminary contact with U.S. representatives to arrange for an "unconditional" end to American military operations against the North. After exchanging numerous proposals of possible sites for the talks, the two sides agreed to meet at Paris. On May 10 the representatives of North Viet-Nam, headed by former Foreign Minister Xuan Thuy, and the representatives of the United States, headed by Ambassador Averell Harriman, met for the first time in the International Conference Center at the Majestic Hotel, Paris.

During the bilateral talks the North Vietnamese negotiators pressed for an unconditional end to the bombing of North Viet-Nam. U.S. representatives offered a complete bombing halt if the other side would agree to reduce its war effort. On November 1 President Johnson ordered a halt to all bombing of the North, with the understanding that North Viet-Nam would not abuse the DMZ or carry out indiscriminate attacks against the major cities of South Viet-Nam. At the same time it was agreed that a new series of expanded meetings to discuss a peace settlement would follow, with the participation of representatives of the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam and the so-called "National Liberation Front."

The first substantive meeting of the expanded talks was held on January 25, 1969, at the Majestic Hotel. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge replaced Ambassador Harriman as chief of the U.S. delegation. He was joined by Pham Dang Lam of the Republic of Viet-Nam. On the Communist side, Xuan Thuy was joined by Tran Buu Kiem of the Viet Cong's National Liberation Front (NLF). Kiem was replaced in June by Madame Nguyen Thi Binh, the "Foreign Minister" of the so-called "Provisional Revolutionary Government" of the Viet Cong. Plenary sessions have been held nearly every week since that time.

Proposals of U. S. and South Viet-Nam

The United States and the Republic of Viet-Nam have presented a comprehensive program for peace at Paris, based on

PARIS TALKS OPEN—Overall view of the meeting table in Paris as the new Vietnam peace talks began on January 25. The United States delegation is in foreground, with its chief, Henry Cabot Lodge, turned to face the camera. On the opposite side are North Vietnamese delegates, with aides behind them. The National Liberation Front is represented at left and South Vietnam at right. Mr. Lodge proposed the immediate restoration of a genuine demilitarized zone astride the border between South and North Vietnam as a "practical first step on the road to peace."

proposals announced by President Nixon on May 14 and by South Vietnamese President Thieu on July 11. Those proposals include provision for:

- *Phased, mutual withdrawals of all non-South Vietnamese forces*—North Vietnamese, United States, and allied. The withdrawal would be carried out on a specified timetable and verified by an international supervisory body acceptable to both sides. We have proposed the complete withdrawal of all outside forces within one year. We have said we would settle for a *de facto* removal of North Vietnamese forces so long as there are reliable assurances that they will not return.
- *A supervised cease-fire* arranged with the participation of an international supervisory body.
- *Internationally supervised elections*, with provision for an electoral commission including representatives of the NLF to assure equal opportunity for all candidates to campaign and to enable all parties to join in watching the polls and counting the ballots. The United States and South Viet-Nam have pledged themselves to abide by the result of these elections, whatever this might be, and have challenged the other side to do likewise.

'We have emphasized to our military commanders that losses be held to a minimum consistent with their basic mission to protect allied forces and the civilian population.'

- *Political amnesty* for all those who renounce the use of force, with no reprisals.
- *Release of prisoners of war* at the earliest possible time.
- *Observance by all parties of the basic elements of the Geneva accords* of 1954 regarding South Viet-Nam and Cambodia, and the Laos accords of 1962.

The United States has repeatedly emphasized that it does not oppose the reunification of Viet-Nam, provided that this is freely decided upon by the people of South and North Viet-Nam.

The United States has said that we do not seek a military victory in Viet-Nam. We have stated repeatedly that we want no permanent military base in South Viet-Nam, and insist on no military alliance with that country.

U. S. Actions

The United States has carried out its part of the understanding which preceded the expanded peace talks at Paris. There has been no bombing of North Viet-Nam since November 1, 1968.

We have also taken other actions to reduce the level of violence. Our air operations against Communist forces in South Viet-Nam have been reduced. We have emphasized to our military commanders that losses be held to a minimum consistent with their basic mission to protect allied forces and the civilian population.

We have reduced the number of our troops in South Viet-Nam. By December 15, 1969, we will have withdrawn 60,000 men. The fact that most of the troops being withdrawn are combat soldiers, not support personnel, underscores our desire to reduce the violence.

President Nixon, in a speech September 18 to the U.N. General Assembly at New York, appealed to all members of

(Continued on Next Page)

(Continued from Preceding Page)

the United Nations to persuade Hanoi to begin serious negotiation. He noted that "the steps we have taken have been responsive to views expressed in this room."

The United States has not limited its peace initiatives to public forums and public statements. Ambassador Lodge has met with North Viet-Nam's chief negotiator at Paris in 11 private sessions. President Nixon in his November 3 address to the nation, disclosed some of our more recent private initiatives for peace. These include:

- Two offers for a rapid, comprehensive settlement which President Nixon made soon after his election through an individual who was directly in contact on a personal basis with the leaders of North Viet-Nam.
- Personal meetings which the President, Secretary of State Rogers, and the President's assistant for national security affairs, Dr. Henry Kissinger, had with representatives of the Soviet Union to enlist their assistance in getting meaningful negotiations started.
- Extended discussions with representatives of other world governments.
- A private and personal plea by President Nixon in a letter to North Viet-Nam's President Ho Chi Minh on July 15, 1969, "to move forward at the conference table toward an early resolution of this tragic war." The President's initiative was rejected.

In addition, the United States has worked diligently with the International Committee of the Red Cross and with other countries to persuade North Viet-Nam that it should abide by the Geneva Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners of War, to which it acceded in 1957. Under this convention a nation involved in an armed conflict is required to allow neutral access to prisoners, to return sick and wounded prisoners, to provide lists of names of those being detained, and to allow mail to and from the prisoners—requirements which Hanoi is ignoring. (Personnel of the other side held prisoner in South Viet-Nam are held in camps open to neutral inspection and maintained in accordance with the Geneva convention regulations.)

'The United States has said that we do not seek a military victory in Viet-Nam. We have stated repeatedly that we want no permanent military base in South Viet-Nam, and insist on no military alliance with that country.'

Proposals of the Other Side

The representatives of North Viet-Nam and the Viet Cong have rejected all our proposals. They have refused even to discuss them seriously, despite the fact that they profess to share some of our objectives, such as:

—Respect for the Vietnamese people's national rights as recognized by the Geneva agreements.

—Self-determination for the South Vietnamese through free and democratic elections.

—Respect for the independence, neutrality, and territorial integrity of Cambodia and Laos.

—Non-participation in any military alliance for North or South Viet-Nam.

The other side has demanded, in effect, our surrender before negotiations. It has called for:

- *Unilateral, unconditional withdrawal of U.S./allied forces.* The other side does not admit that North Vietnamese troops are in South Viet-Nam, despite massive evidence to the contrary. They refuse to entertain any discussion of "mutual" withdrawal. They have denounced President Nixon's withdrawal of 25,000 U.S. troops as a "fraud," and the more recent Presidential order for the withdrawal of an additional 35,000 or more men as "a perfidious trick."
- *The replacement of the legitimate, elected government of the Republic of Viet-Nam* by an imposed "provisional coalition" of their own choosing. This "provisional coalition" would rule South Viet-Nam during the interim between the restoration of peace and the holding of general "elections" (which the Communists would obviously control if carried out by a "coalition" of this nature).
- *General elections* for a constituent assembly which would write a new constitution and would be obliged to install a permanent "coalition" government.

Actions of the Other Side

North Viet-Nam continues to maintain massive forces in South Viet-Nam and to exhort its followers to total military victory. Over two-thirds of all combat forces facing the Republic of Viet-Nam and its allies in the South are North Vietnamese. In the Saigon region, North Vietnamese personnel make up over 80 percent of all enemy combat forces. North Vietnamese troops have recently been sent into the southern Delta area for the first time, while U.S. forces in that area have been pulled out.

Despite the deescalation of the fighting in recent months, the other side's campaign of terror and assassination against South Vietnamese civilians continues at a high level. This includes indiscriminate rocket attacks against civilian targets—wounding and killing women and children, destroying hospitals, schools, and homes in Saigon and other cities.

North Viet-Nam has violated the 1954 agreements on Cambodia and the 1962 agreements on Laos by infiltrating men and supplies into these countries and by establishing military bases along their eastern border regions.

The North Vietnamese and Viet Cong also have blatantly disregarded the Geneva convention on prisoners of war. They have specifically refused to provide a list of prisoners they hold, to permit mail and packages to and from the prisoners, or to allow the International Committee of the Red Cross to visit the prisoners and check on conditions in the camps. They

Pham Dang Lam
Republic of Vietnam chief delegate

Mrs. Nguyen Thi Binh
National Liberation Front chief delegate

Xuan Thuy
Hanoi's chief delegate

have also refused to discuss the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners.

U. S./Allied Goals

The United States and its allies are participating in the Paris meetings because we want the war in Viet-Nam to come to a negotiated end. We will continue to search for common ground between the two sides. To us, the search for common ground involves examination of each other's position, exchange of views, and a willingness to reach a compromise through serious negotiation.

Our objective in Viet-Nam is limited. We seek the opportunity for the South Vietnamese people to determine their own political future without outside interference.

President Nixon has said, "The only item which is not negotiable is the right of the people of South Viet-Nam to determine their own future free of ouside interference . . . The time for meaningful negotiations has . . . arrived."

President Nixon also said: "In pursuing our limited objective, we insist on no rigid diplomatic formula. Peace could be achieved by a formal negotiated settlement. Peace could be achieved by an informal understanding, providing that the understanding is clear, and that there were adequate assurances that it would be observed."

'To us, the search for common ground involves examination of each other's position, exchange of views, and a willingness to reach a compromise through serious negotiations.'

The Need for Response

Our proposals at the Paris talks embody the President's suggested formula for a peaceful settlement in Viet Nam. We believe these proposals are reasonable and fair, and that they indicate our willingness to negotiate a settlement rather than dictate one. What has been missing at the talks so far is a similar willingness on the other side.

"We have gone as far as we can or should go in opening the door to peace," President Nixon stated on July 30 at Saigon, "and now it is time for the other side to respond."

In his November 3 address, the President pointed out:

'It's become clear that the obstacle in negotiating an end to the war is not the President of the United States. It is not the South Vietnamese Government. The obstacle is the other side's absolute refusal to show the least willingness to join us in seeking a just peace.'

(The preceding article appeared in a Department of State publication, "Viet-Nam Information Notes." Since publication, Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge resigned as the chief U.S. negotiator. The acting chief and head of the U.S. delegation is Philip C. Habib, a career diplomat. He has been chief advisor to Ambassador Lodge.)

COMMANDERS DIGEST

THIS PUBLICATION CONTAINS OFFICIAL INFORMATION, NEWS AND POLICY, DIRECT FROM WASHINGTON AUTHORIZED SOURCES.

Published weekly by American Forces Press Service, 1117 N. 19th St., Arlington, Va. 22209, a unified activity of the Office of Information for the Armed Forces, OASD (M&RA). Reproduction of content is authorized. Suggested dateline for materials used is WASHINGTON (AFPS).

General Ryan Expresses Views on Security of U.S.

When General John D. Ryan, Air Force chief of staff, presented his "overview" of the U.S. national security outlook to the World Affairs Forum in Tucson, Ariz., he said, "the hard fact is that our efforts to move ahead in social and economic areas can succeed only if we are able at the same time to preserve our national security and vital interests within the free world."

Because of that "hard fact" Gen. Ryan asked his audience to consider some of the primary factors that are sure to have an important bearing on the continued success in maintaining the security of the United States.

He outlined four factors: 1—The growing tendency to ignore or downgrade the military threat. 2—The pressure to redefine our worldwide commitments. 3—The key trends that are now affecting the types and levels of U.S. military power. 4—Some management approaches to the goal of greater military effectiveness.

Following are excerpts from Gen. Ryan's four points:

On the subject of downgrading the military threat: ". . . As for the tendency to ignore or downgrade the threat —a tendency more evident now than at any time since World War II—there are several typical symptoms of that attitude which we need to examine. I will start by calling attention to a widespread assumption about the intentions of the Soviets.

"On this score, we hear it said repeatedly that the possibility of their considering a massive strike against this country is inconceivable.

"Those who express this view, in my opinion, either ignore the buildup of strategic capabilities by the Soviets or assume that their purpose of deterrence is identical to our own. A massive first strike by the Soviets can never be ruled out as a possibility by those of us who hold the responsibility for the defense of our country.

"And the consequences of such a strike are so grave that we must continue to give first priority to the task of deterring it. . . .

". . . However much the critics may choose to ignore it, the momentum is already there and is now becoming decidely unbalanced in favor of our potential adversary. As a result, the Soviet's capacity for strategic offense and defense has continued to grow at a rate far in excess of our own."

General Ryan

Gen. Ryan said a brief review of "hard realities" should help the U.S. avoid several hazards in redefining this country's commitments.

"One is the hazard of confusing the preferred condition of the world with the real condition of the world. And the other is the hazard of placing excessive reliance on one type of strategic weapon instead of maintaining our present Triad of manned bombers and land-based and sea-based missiles."

Gen. Ryan said he was confident that most people in this country—and especially in positions of responsibility—"have acquired the insights that are necessary to avoid these hazards.

"For this reason," he said, "I am also confident that we have a good prospect for maintaining our commitments at a level that will meet the two primary requirements of national security."

He emphasized that the most urgent task is that of using our strategic forces to deter a large-scale nuclear strike against this country and its allies. The secondary, but far more complex task, is that of using both our tactical and strategic forces to protect our vital interests throughout the world.

Gen. Ryan said from one important standpoint Air Force requests for new systems will differ widely from those of the past. For the most part, he said, this difference will be reflected in the trend toward lower inventories of high-cost equipment. He said the primary cause of the trend toward high-cost weapons is the need to maintain an advantage over the enemy—"an advantage that we can hold only through a wise and vigorous exploitation of technology."

Looking at the management picture, Gen. Ryan said, "I am glad to say that we have received the encouragement and backing of OSD in moving toward a substantial degree of decentralization. Again, where development and procurement actions are concerned, this will enable us to focus responsibility on the project officers and managers who are close to the scene. It will also give them more authority and quicker access to the approvals they need for essential changes."

Philip A. Odeen Appointed To New DoD Position

Philip A. Odeen has been appointed Deputy Assistant Secretary (Regional Programs) in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis).

This new position combines two Deputy Assistant Secretaryships in Systems Analysis which have been abolished: (a) Regional Forces Programs and (b) Southeast Asia Programs.

In 1960, Mr. Odeen joined the staff of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and worked in the Economic Advisor's Office of OASD (Comptroller). In 1963, he joined the staff of Headquarters, U.S. European Command in Paris, serving as an intelligence specialist in the Plans and Programs Office of the Intelligence (J–2) Division.

Mr. Odeen returned to the Pentagon in August, 1965, with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis). Initially, he served as a Special Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis). In 1967, he became Director of the Southeast Asia Resources Division. In March, 1969, he was designated Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary (Regional Programs).

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.
Price 5 cents (single copy). Subscription Price: $2.50 per year; $3.25 additional for foreign mailing.
☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1969 393/216/S-21